CROSSLINE: Breaking ''Security-by-Crash'' based Memory Isolation in AMD
  SEV by Li, Mengyuan et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
00
14
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 A
ug
 20
20
CROSSLINE: Breaking “Security-by-Crash” based
Memory Isolation in AMD SEV
Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
The Ohio State University
li.7533@osu.edu, {yinqian, zlin}@cse.ohio-state.edu
Abstract—AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is an
emerging security feature on AMD processors that allows virtual
machines to run on encrypted memory and perform confidential
computing even with an untrusted hypervisor. This paper first
demystifies SEV’s improper use of address space identifier (ASID)
for controlling accesses of a VM to encrypted memory pages,
cache lines, and TLB entries. We then present the CROSSLINE
attacks, a novel class of attacks against SEV that allow the
adversary to launch an attacker VM and change its ASID to
that of the victim VM to impersonate the victim. We present
two variants of CROSSLINE attacks: CROSSLINE V1 decrypts
victim’s page tables or memory blocks following the format of
a page table entry; CROSSLINE V2 constructs encryption and
decryption oracles by executing instructions of the victim VM.
We have successfully performed CROSSLINE attacks on SEV and
SEV-ES processors.
I. INTRODUCTION
AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a secu-
rity extension for the AMD Virtualization (AMD-V) archi-
tecture [4], which allows one physical server to efficiently
run multiple guest virtual machines (VM) concurrently on
encrypted memory. When SEV is enabled, the memory pages
used by a guest VM are transparently encrypted by a secure
co-processor using an ephemeral key that is unique to each
VM, thus allowing the guest VMs to compute on encrypted
memory. SEV is AMD’s ambitious movement towards confi-
dential cloud computing, which is gaining traction in the cloud
industry. For instance, Google Cloud recently provides SEV-
enabled VMs, called Confidential VMs, as its first product of
Confidential Computing [9].
Unlike traditional security assumptions in which the trust-
worthiness of the system software is taken for granted, SEV
is built atop a threat model where system software including
hypervisor can be untrusted.
“SEV technology is built around a threat model where
an attacker is assumed to have access to not only exe-
cute user level privileged code on the target machine, but
can potentially execute malware at the higher privileged
hypervisor level as well.” [15].
Consequently, such an audacious threat assumption has
been examined under the microscope with numerous attacks
(e.g., [10], [8], [6], [20], [19], [17], [27]) since its debut in
2017. With the assumption of a malicious hypervisor, these
attacks successfully compromise the confidentiality and/or in-
tegrity provided by SEV’s memory encryption by exploiting a
number of design flaws, including unencrypted virtual machine
control blocks (VMCB) [10], [27], unauthenticated memory
encryption [10], [8], [6], [17], insecure ECB mode of memory
encryption [8], [17], unprotected nested page tables [20], [19],
and unprotected I/O operations [17].
In light of these security issues, AMD has enhanced SEV
with a sequence of microcode and hardware updates, most no-
tably SEV with Encrypted State (SEV-ES) and SEV with Se-
cure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP). SEV-ES encrypts the VMCB
of a VM to protect register values at VMEXITs; SEV-ES
processors are already commercially available. To address the
most commonly exploited flaw—the lack of memory integrity
for SEV VMs (including unauthenticated memory encryption
and unprotected nested page tables), AMD plans to release
SEV-SNP, which introduces a Reverse Map Table (RMP) to
dictate ownership of the memory pages, so that the majority
of the previously known attacks will be mitigated.
However, in this paper, we move our attention to another,
yet-to-be-reported design flaw of SEV—the improper ASID-
based memory isolation and access control. Specifically, SEV
adopts an ASID-based access control for guest VMs’ accesses
to SEV processor’s internal caches and the encrypted physical
memory. At launch time, each SEV VM is assigned a unique
ASID, which is used as the tag of cache lines and translation
lookaside buffer (TLB) entries. A secure processor (dubbed
AMD-SP) that is in charge of generating and maintaining the
ephemeral memory encryption keys also uses the current VM’s
ASID to index the keys for encrypting/decrypting memory
pages upon memory access requests. As such, the ASID of an
SEV VM plays a critical role in controlling its accesses to the
private data in the cache-memory hierarchy. Nevertheless, the
assignment of ASID to a VM is under complete control of the
hypervisor. An implicit “security-by-crash” security principle
is adopted in the SEV design:
“Although the hypervisor has control over the ASID
used to run a VM and select the encryption key, this
is not considered a security concern since a loaded
encryption key is meaningless unless the guest was
already encrypted with that key. If the incorrect key is
ever loaded or the wrong ASID is used for a guest, the
first instruction fetch of that guest will fail as memory
will be decrypted with the wrong key, causing junk data
to be executed (and very likely causing a fault).”[15]
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the validity
of this “security-by-crash” design principle. To do so, we
first study how ASIDs are used in SEV processors to isolate
encrypted memory pages as well as CPU caches and TLBs. We
also explore how ASIDs are managed by the hypervisor, how
an ASID of a VM can be altered by the hypervisor at runtime,
and why the VM with altered ASID crashes afterwards.
This exploration leads to the discovery of several potential
opportunities for a VM with an altered ASID to momentarily
breach the ASID-based memory isolation before it crashes.
Next, based on our exploration, we then present
CROSSLINE attacks1, which exploit such a momentary ex-
ecution to breach the confidentiality and integrity of SEV
VMs. Specifically, an adversary controlling the hypervisor can
launch an attacker VM and, during its VMEXIT, assign it
with the same ASID as the victim VM, and then resume it,
leading to the violation of the ASID-based access control to
the victim’s encrypted memory.
We mainly present two variants of CROSSLINE. In
CROSSLINE V1, even though no instructions are executed by
the attacker VM after VMRUN, we show that it is possible to
load memory pages encrypted with the victim VM’s memory
encryption key (VEK) during page table walks, thus revealing
the encrypted content of the “page table entries” (PTE) through
nested page faults. This attack variant enables the adversary
to extract the entire encrypted page table of the SEV guest
VM, as well as any memory blocks conforming to the PTE
format. We have also successfully demonstrated CROSSLINE
V1 on SEV-ES machines, in which we devise techniques to
bypass the integrity checks of launching the attacker VM with
the victim VM’s encrypted VMCB, while keeping the victim
VM completely unaffected. In CROSSLINE V2, by carefully
crafting its nested page tables, the attacker VM could manage
to momentarily execute arbitrary instructions of the victim
VM. By wisely selecting the target instructions, the adversary
is able to construct encryption oracles and decryption oracles,
which enable herself to breach both integrity and confidential-
ity of the victim VM. CROSSLINE V2 is confined by SEV-ES,
but its capability is stronger than V1.
As extensions of the two attack variants, we also discuss
(1) another variant of CROSSLINE, which allows the attacker
VM to reuse the TLB entries of the victim VM for address
translation and execute some instructions, even without any
successful page table walks; and (2) the potential applicability
of CROSSLINE on SEV-SNP.
Differences from known attacks. CROSSLINE differs from
all previously demonstrated SEV attacks in several aspects.
First, CROSSLINE does not rely on SEV’s memory integrity
flaws, which is a common pre-requisite for all known attacks
on SEV. Although CROSSLINE may not work on SEV-SNP,
the protection does not come from memory integrity, but a
side-effect of the RMP implementation. Second, CROSSLINE
attacks do not directly interact with the victim VMs and thus
enable stealthy attacks. As long as the ephemeral encryption
key of the victim VM is kept in the AMD-SP and the victim’s
1CROSSLINE refers to interference between telecommunication signals in
adjacent circuits that causes signals to cross over each other.
encrypted memory pages are not deallocated, CROSSLINE at-
tacks can be performed even when the victim VM is shutdown.
Therefore, CROSSLINE is undetectable by the victim VM. In
contrast, prior attacks relying on I/O operations of the victim
VM [17], [8], [20], [19] are detectable by the victim VM.
CROSSLINE questions a fundamental security assumption of
“security-by-crash” underpinning the design of SEV’s memory
and cache isolation. The demonstration of these attack variants
suggests that SEV should not rely on adversary-controlled
ASIDs to mediate access to the encrypted memory. To elimi-
nate the threats, a principled solution is to maintain the identity
of VMs in the hardware, which unfortunately requires some
fundamental changes in the architecture. As far as we know,
SEV-SNP will not integrate such changes.
Responsible disclosure. We have disclosed CROSSLINE at-
tacks to AMD via emails in December 2019 and discussed the
paper with AMD engineers by phone in January 2020. The
demonstrated attacks and their novelty have been acknowl-
edged. As discussed in the paper, neither of the two attack
variants directly affect SEV-SNP. Therefore, AMD would not
replace ASID-based isolation in the short term, but may invest
more principled isolation mechanisms in the future.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions
to the security of AMD SEV and other trusted execution
environments.
• It investigates SEV’s ASID-based memory, cache, and TLB
isolation, and demystifies its “security-by-crash” design prin-
ciple (§III). It raises security concerns of the “security-by-
crash” based memory and TLB isolation for the first time.
• It presents two variants of CROSSLINE attacks—the only
attacks that breach the confidentiality and integrity of an SEV
VM without exploiting SEV’s memory integrity flaws (§IV).
• It presents successful attacks against SEV and SEV-
ES processors (§V). It also discusses the applicability of
CROSSLINE on the upcoming SEV-SNP processors (§VI).
II. BACKGROUND
Secure Memory Encryption (SME). SME is AMD’s x86
extension for real-time main memory encryption, which is
supported in AMD CPU with Zen micro architecture from
2017 [24]. Aiming to defeat cold boot attack and DRAM
interface snooping, an embedded Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) engine encrypts data when the processor writes
to the DRAM and decrypts it when processor reads it. The
entire DRAM is encrypted with a single ephemeral key which
is randomly generated each time the machine is booted. A
32-bit ARM Cortex-A5 Secure Processor (AMD-SP) [21] is
integrated in the system-on-chip (SOC) alongside the main
processor, providing a dedicated security subsystem, storing,
and managing the ephemeral key. Although all memory pages
are encrypted by default, the operating system can mark some
pages as unencrypted by clearing the C-bit (the 48th bit) of the
corresponding page table entries (PTE). However, regardless
of the C-bit, all code pages and page table pages are encrypted
by default. With Transparent SME (TSME), a special mode of
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Figure 1: AMD-V nested page table walks [1].
operation of SME, the entire memory is encrypted, ignoring
the C-bits of the PTEs.
AMD Virtualization (AMD-V). AMD-V is a set of extensions
of AMD processors to support virtualization. Nested Page
Tables (nPT) is introduced by AMD-V to facilitate address
translation, which is officially marketed as Rapid Virtual-
ization Indexing [1]. AMD-V’s nPT provides two levels of
address translation. When nPT is enabled, the guest VM and
the hypervisor have their own CR3s: a guest CR3 (gCR3) and
a nested CR3 (nCR3). The gCR3 contains the guest physical
address of the gPT; the nCR3 contains the system physical
address of the nPT. To translate a virtual address (gVA) used
by the guest VM into the system physical address (sPA), the
processor first references the guest page table (gPT) to obtain
the guest physical address (gPA) of each page-table page. To
translate the gPA of each page, an nPT walk is performed.
During the nPT walk, the gPA is treated as host virtual address
(hVA) and translated into the sPA using the nPT. These address
translation steps are illustrated in Figure 1.
Translation lookaside buffers (TLB) and Page Walk Cache
(PWC) are internal buffers in AMD processors for speeding up
the address translation. AMD-V also relies on these internal
buffers for performance improvements. AMD-V further
introduces an nTLB for nPT. A successful nPT walk caches the
translation from gPA to sPA in the nTLB for fast accesses [4],
while the normal TLBs are used to store translations from
virtual addresses of either the host or the guest to sPA.
To exchange data between the hypervisor and the guest
VMs, a data structure dubbed the virtual machine control block
(VMCB) is located on a shared memory page. VMCB stores
the guest VM’s register values and some control bits during
VMEXIT. The VMCB is under the control of the hypervisor
to configure the behaviors of the guest VM.
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). SEV combines
AMD-V architecture with SME to allow individual VMs to
have their own VM Encryption Key (VEK) [2]. Each VEK is
generated by the processor and assigned to an SEV VM when
launched by the hypervisor. All VEKs are stored in the AMD-
SP and are never exposed to DRAM during their entire life
cycle. SEV distinguishes different VEKs using ASIDs. When
a memory request is made, the AMD-SP determines which
key to be used with the current ASID. In combination with
encryption modes specified in the guest page tables (gPT) and
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Figure 2: ASID-based memory isolation in SEV.
the nested page tables (nPT) [1], SEV achieves page-granular
memory encryption with different keys.
III. DEMYSTIFYING ASID-BASED ISOLATION
ASID was initially designed by AMD to tag TLB entries so
that unnecessary TLB flushes can be avoided when switching
between guest VMs and the host. SEV reuses ASID as the
indices of VEKs stored in AMD-SP. Cache tags are also
extended accordingly to isolate cache lines with different
ASIDs. As a result, ASID becomes the de-facto identifier used
by SEV processors to control the software’s accesses to virtual
memory, caches, and TLBs (as shown in Figure 2).
However, following AMD-V, SEV allows the hypervisor
to have (almost) complete authority over the management of
ASIDs, which gives rise to security concerns as a malicious
hypervisor may abuse this capability to breach ASID-based
isolation. Interestingly, AMD adopts a “security-by-crash” and
assumes if “the wrong ASID is used for a guest”, the execution
of the instruction will “likely cause a fault” [15]. In this
section, we set off to understand and demystify how ASIDs
are used to isolate memory, cache, and TLBs in SEV, and how
ASIDs are managed by the hypervisor.
A. ASID-based Isolation
First, we explore in depth how ASID is used for access
control in the virtual memory, CPU caches, and TLBs.
1) ASID-based Memory Isolation: ASIDs are used by the
AMD-SP to index VEKs of SEV VMs. The SEV hardware
ensures the data and code of an SEV VM is encrypted in the
DRAM and only decrypted when loaded into the SOC. Specifi-
cally, each memory read from an SEV VM consists of memory
fetches by the memory controller of a 128-bit aligned memory
block, followed by an AES decryption by AMD-SP using the
VEK corresponding to the current ASID. The current ASID
is an integer stored in a hidden register of the current CPU
core, which cannot be accessed by software in the guest VM.
SEV allows the guest OS to decide, by setting or clearing
the C-bit of the PTE, whether each virtual memory page is
(treated as) private (encrypted with the guest’s VEK) or shared
(either encrypted with the host’s VEK or unencrypted). For
instance, when the C-bit of a page is set, memory reads from
this virtual-physical mapping is considered encrypted with the
guest VM’s VEK, regardless of its true encryption status, and
thus a memory read in that page will be decrypted using the
VEK of the current ASID.
However, the hypervisor is able to manipulate the nested
C-bit (nC-bit) in nPT. When the gC-bit (the C-bit of the gPT)
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Table I: Effects of gC-bits nC-bit. M is the plaintext; Ek() is the
encryption function under key k; kg and kh represent the guest VM
and the hypervisor’s VEK, respectively.
nC-bit=0 nC-bit=1
gC-bit=0 M Ekh(M)
gC-bit=1 Ekg (M) Ekg (M)
conflicts with the nC-bit, AMD-SP encrypts the memory pages
according to rules specified in Table I: When gC-bit=0 and
nC-bit=1, the page is encrypted with the hypervisor’s VEK;
when gC-bit=1, regardless of the nC-bit, the page is encrypted
with the guest VM’s VEK; when gC-bit=0 and nC-bit=0, the
page is not encrypted. Following SME, the code pages are
always considered private to the guest VM and thus is always
encrypted regardless of the guest C-bits. Similarly, the gPT is
also always encrypted with the guest’s VEK, while the nPT is
fully controlled by the hypervisor.
2) ASID-based TLB Isolation: ASID was originally in-
troduced to avoid TLB flushes when the execution con-
text switches between the guest VM and the hyper-
visor, which is achieved by extending each TLB tag
with ASID. With the ASID capability, when observ-
ing activities like MOV-to-CR3, context switches, updates
of CR0.PG/CR4.PGE/CR4.PAE/CR4.PSE, the hardware
does not need to flush the entire TLB, but only the TLB entries
tagged with the current ASID [4]. However, for the purpose of
TLB isolation, the management of ASIDs for non-SEV VMs
and SEV VMs is slightly different.
Non-SEV VMs. Each VCPU of a non-SEV VM may have
different ASIDs, which can be assigned dynamically before
each VMRUN. More specifically, before the hypervisor is
about to resume a VCPU with VMRUN, it checks if the VCPU
was the one running on this CPU core before the control
was trapped into the hypervisor. If so, the hypervisor keeps
the ASID of the VCPU unchanged and resumes the VCPU
directly; if not, the hypervisor selects another ASID (from
the ASID pool) and assign it to the VCPU. In the former
case, TLB entries can be reused by the VCPU as its ASID
is unchanged. However, in the latter case, the residual TLB
entries (tagged with ASID of the hypervisor or the previous
VCPU) should not be reused.
SEV VMs. SEV processors rely on a similar strategy to
isolate entries in the TLBs with ASID. However, instead of
dynamically assigning an ASID to a VCPU before VMRUN,
all VCPUs of the same SEV VM are assigned the same ASID
at launch time, which should in theory remain the same during
the entire life cycle of the SEV VM.
3) ASID-based Cache Isolation: On platforms that sup-
port SEV, cache lines are tagged with the VM’s ASID indicat-
ing to which VM this data belongs, thus preventing the data
from being misused by entities other than its owner [15]. When
data is loaded into cache lines, according to the current ASID,
AMD-SP automatically decrypts the data with the correspond-
ing VEK and stores the ASID value into the cache tag. When
a cache line is flushed or evicted, AMD-SP uses the ASID in
the cache tag to determine which VEK to use when encrypting
this cache line before writing it back to DRAM. The cache tag
is also extended to include the C-bit [15]. Because the cache is
now tagged with ASID and C-bit, cache coherence of the same
physical address is not maintained if the two virtual memory
pages do not have the same ASID and C-bit.
B. ASID Management
1) ASID Life Cycle: The hypervisor reserves a pool (i.e.,
a range of integers) of available ASIDs for all VMs (we call
all-ASID pool for simplicity), and a separate pool of ASIDs
for SEV VMs (SEV-ASID pool). The maximum ID number of
the all-ASID pool is determined by CPUID 0x8000000a[EBX]
(e.g., 32768, thus the available ASIDs are whole numbers
between 1 and 32768). The maximum ID number of the SEV-
ASID pool is determined by CPUID 0x8000001f[ECX] (e.g.,
15, which suggests the legal ASIDs for SEV VMs are 1
to 15). Note that ASID 0 is reserved for the host OS (i.e.,
hypervisor), and is also not allowed to be assigned to a VCPU
for processors with or without SEV extensions [4].
On SEV platforms, the hypervisor uses ACTIVATE com-
mand to inform AMD-SP that a given guest is bound with
an ASID and uses DEACTIVATE command to de-allocate
an ASID from the guest. The hypervisor may re-allocate an
existing ASID to another VM, if there is no available ASID
in the SEV-ASID pool [2].
At runtime, when the processor runs under the guest mode,
the guest VM’s ASID is stored in the ASID register that
is hidden from software; when the processor runs under the
host mode, the register is set to 0, which is the hypervisor’s
ASID. The guest VM’s ASID is stored at the VMCB during
VMEXIT. After VMRUN the processor restores the ASID in
the VMCB. The VMCB State Cache allows the processor
to cache some guest register values between VMEXIT and
VMRUN for performance enhancement. The physical address
of the VMCB is used to perform access control of the VMCB
State Cache. However, the VMCB clean field controlled by
the hypervisor can be used to force the processor to discard
selected cached values. For example, bit-2 of the VMCB clean
field indicates that an ASID reload is needed; bit-4 of the
clean field indicates fields related to nest paging are dirty and
needed to be reloaded from the VMCB. Some VMCB fields
are strictly not cached and the corresponding register values
will be reloaded from the VMCB every time. For example,
offset 058h of the VMCB is a TLB control field to indicate
whether the hardware needs to flush TLB after VMRUN; this
field is always uncached.
2) ASID Restrictions: Launch-time restrictions. On pro-
cessors supporting SEV, the hypervisor cannot bind a current
active ASID in the SEV-ASID pool to an SEV VM during
launch time [2]. However, an adversary is able to deactivate the
victim SEV VM and then activate an attacker SEV VM with
the same ASID. The hardware requires the hypervisor to exe-
cute a WBINVD instruction and a DF_FLUSH instruction after
deactivating an ASID and before re-activating it. The WBINVD
flushes all modified cache lines and invalidates all cache lines.
The DF_FLUSH instruction flushes data fabric write buffers
of all CPU cores. If these instructions are not executed before
associating the ASID with a new VM, a WBINVD_REQUIRED
or DFFLUSH_REQUIRED error will be returned by the AMD-
SP and the VM launch process will be terminated.
4
This restriction is critical to the isolation of cache lines.
Otherwise, victim VM’s residual cache data can be read by
subsequent attacker VM. In particular, the attacker VM can
use the WBINVD instruction to flush the cache data to memory.
Cache lines belonging to victim VM will thus be encrypted
with the attacker VM’s VEK and then flushed into the memory.
Subsequent reads to those memory data will return plaintext
and thus allow the adversary to extract the data.
Run-time restrictions. After a VM is launched, the hypervisor
can change its ASID during VMEXITs, by changing the
ASID field of its VMCB, which will take effect when the
VM is resumed. There is no additional hardware restriction
at runtime. As such, it is possible to have two SEV VMs
concurrently with the same ASID on the same machine,
though the one with a wrong ASID will crash very soon.
Moreover, the VMCB also contains a field (090h) to indicate
if the VM is an SEV VM or a non-SEV VM. Therefore,
it is possible to first launch an SEV VM and a non-SEV
VM with the same ASID, and then, during VMEXITs of
the non-SEV VM, change the non-SEV VM into an SEV
VM by setting the corresponding bit in the VMCB. We have
experimentally confirmed this possibility on our testbed (as
shown in Section VI-A). It suggests that the hardware trusts
the values of VMCB to determine (1) if the VM to be resumed
is an SEV VM and (2) what ASID is associated with it.
The hardware does not store this information to a secure
memory region and use it for validation. The only additional
validation performed by the AMD-SP is that the ASIDs of
SEV VMs must fall into the valid ranges2. Therefore, while
a VM was launched as a non-SEV VM, we can effectively
(though momentarily) make it an SEV VM with the same
ASID as another SEV VM.
3) “Security-by-Crash”: As the hypervisor has the liberty
of changing the ASIDs of both SEV VMs and non-SEV VMs,
security concerns arise when the hypervisor is not considered
a trusted party. However, it is believed that when an SEV
VM is resumed with an ASID different from its own, its
subsequent execution will lead to unpredictable results and
eventually crash the VM.
Specifically, to change the ASID of a VM (either an SEV
and non-SEV VM), the hypervisor can directly edit the ASID
field of the VMCB, set the VMCB clean-field to inform the
hardware to bypass the VMCB State Cache, and then resume
the VM with VMRUN. After the VM is resumed, if the
RFLAGS.IF bit in the VMCB is set, the virtual address
specified by the interrupt descriptor-table register (IDTR) will
be accessed, because the guest OS will try to handle interrupts
immediately; if the RFLAGS.IF bit is cleared, the instruction
pointed to by NRIP—the next sequential instruction pointer—
is going to be fetched and executed. However, in either case,
the virtual address translation will cause problems.
First, any TLB entries remaining due to its previous exe-
cution becomes invalid because its ASID has been changed;
the ASID tag in the TLB entries would not match. Second,
2Specifically, the valid ASID range of SEV VMs are divided so that the
lower values are for SEV-ES VMs. CPUID Fn8000 001F[ECX] specifies valid
SEV ASIDs and CPUID Fn8000 001F[EDX] specifies the minimum ASID
values used for SEV (but SEV-ES-disabled) VMs.
a page table walk is unlikely to succeed, as its own page
tables are encrypted using the VEK indexed by its own ASID.
As a result, the top-level page table will be decrypted into
meaningless bit strings. References to a “page table entry” of
this page will trigger an exception to be handled by the guest
OS. Finally, a handler of the guest OS is to be invoked to
handle the exception. However, any reference of this handler
will be decrypted using a wrong VEK, leading to a triple fault
that eventually crashes the VM.
C. Summary
We highlight a few key points of SEV’s “security-by-crash”
based memory isolation mechanisms.
• ASID is used for access control. ASID is the only identifier
used for controlling accesses to virtual memory, caches, and
TLBs. Once a VM is successfully resumed from VMEXIT,
the CPU and AMD-SP only rely on the ASID (loaded from
its VMCB) to validate memory requests.
• ASID is managed by the hypervisor. The hypervisor may
assign any ASID (including the ASID of another active SEV
VM) to an SEV or non-SEV VM during VMEXIT. The only
restriction enforced by the hardware is that the ASID must
fall into the range in accordance to the VM’s SEV type.
• Security is achieved by VM crash. The security of the
mechanism relies solely on the faults triggered during the
execution of the VM if its ASID has been changed. The faults
can be caused by memory decryption with an improper VEK
during instruction fetches or page table walks.
• Cache/TLB entries are flushed by the hypervisor. The
hypervisor controls whether and when to flush TLB and
cache entries associated with a specific ASID. Only limited
constraints are enforced by the hardware during ASID acti-
vation. Misuse of these resources is possible.
IV. CROSSLINE ATTACKS
The goal of our CROSSLINE attacks is to extract the
memory content of the victim VM that is encrypted with the
victim VM’s VEK. We make no assumption of the adversary’s
knowledge of the victim VM, including its kernel version,
the applications running in it, etc. The common steps of the
CROSSLINE attacks are the following: (1) the adversary who
controls the hypervisor launches a carefully crafted attacker
VM; (2) the hypervisor alters the ASID of the attacker VM to
be the same as that of the victim VM during VMEXITs; (3)
the hypervisor prepares a desired execution environment for
the attacker VM by altering its VMCB and/or its nPT; (4) the
attacker VM resumes after VMRUN, allowing a momentary
execution before it crashes. During the momentary execution,
memory accesses from the attacker VM will trigger memory
decryption using the victim VM’s VEK.
Although the attacker VM crashes shortly—due to the
ASID-based isolation in TLB, caches, and memory—we show
that this momentary execution, though very brief, already
enables the attacker VM to impersonate the victim VM and
breach its confidentiality and integrity. Note that the only
requirement of the victim VM at the time of the attack is that
5
Figure 3: Workflow of CROSSLINE V1.
it has been launched and the targeted memory pages have been
encrypted in the physical memory. Whether or not the victim
VM is concurrently running during the attack is not important.
Therefore, CROSSLINE is stealthy in that it does not interact
with the victim VM at all. Detection of such attacks from the
victim VM itself is unlikely.
A. Variant 1: Extracting Encrypted Memory through Page
Table Walks
The CROSSLINE V1 explores the use of nested page table
walks during the momentary execution to decrypt the victim
VM’s memory protected by SEV. To ease the description, let
the victim VM’s ASID be 1 and the attacker VM’s ASID be
2. We use SPFN0 to denote the system page frame number
of the targeted memory page encrypted with the victim VM’s
VEK. We use sPA0 to denote the system physical address of
one 8-byte aligned memory block on SPFN0, which is the
target memory the adversary aims to read. The workflow of
CROSSLINE V1 is shown in Figure 3. When the hypervisor
handles a VMEXIT of the attacker VM, the following steps
are executed:
➀ Clear the Present bits. The hypervisor alters the attacker
VM’s nPT to clear the Present bits of the PTEs of all memory
pages. Thereafter, any memory access from the attacker VM
after VMRUN will trigger a nested page fault, because the
mapping from gPA to sPA in the NPT is missing.
➁ Remap the current gCR3 of the attacker VM. The
hypervisor remaps the gCR3 of the current process in the
attacker VM by altering the nPT. Now the gCR3 maps to
SPFN0. The hypervisor then sets the Present bit of this new
mapping in the nPT.
➂ Modify the attacker VM’s VMCB. The hypervisor
changes the attacker VM’s ASID field in the VMCB to the
victim VM’s ASID (from 2 to 1 in this example).
➃ Specify the targeted page offset. Before resuming the
attacker VM with VMRUN, the hypervisor also modifies the
value of NRIP in VMCB to specify which offset (i.e., sPA0)
of the target page (i.e., SPFN0) to decrypt. Specifically, in a
64-bit Linux OS, bits 47 to 12 of a virtual address are used to
index the page tables: bits 47-39 for the top-level page table;
bits 38-30 for the second-level; bits 29-21 for the third; and
bits 20-12 for the last-level page table. Each 4KB page in the
page table has 512 entries (8 bytes each) and each entry con-
tains the page frame number of the memory page of next-level
Algorithm 1: Determine NRIP when dumping one layer of page table
(4096 bytes)
initialization;
while dumping the page do
try to dump 8-byte memory block sPA0 ;
if sPA0% 0x1000 < 0x800 then
NRIP = 0x8000000000* (sPA0% 0x1000 / 0x8);
else
NRIP = 0xffff000000000000 + 0x8000000000* (sPA0%
0x1000 / 0x8);
end
end
page table or, in the case of the last-level page table, the page
frame number of the target address. CROSSLINE V1 exploits
the top-level page table walk to decrypt one 8-byte block each
time. To control the offset of the 8-byte block within the page,
the adversary modifies the value of NRIP stored in the VMCB
so that its bit 47-39 can be used to index the top-level page
table. The algorithm to choose NRIP properly is specified in
Algorithm 1. Specifically, if the offset is less than 0x800, the
NRIP is set to be in the range of 0x0000000000000000 -
0x00007fffffffffff (canonical virtual addresses of user space);
if the offset is greater than or equal to 0x800, the NRIP is
set to be in the range of 0xffff800000000000 - 0xffffffffffffffff
(canonical virtual addresses of kernel space).
➄ Extract secrets from nested page faults. After VMRUN,
the resumed attacker VM immediately fetches the next instruc-
tion to be executed from the memory. This memory access is
performed with ASID=1 (i.e., the victim VM’s ASID). The
address translation is also performed with the same ASID. As
the TLB does not hold valid entries for address translation, and
thus an address translation starts with a page table walk from
the gCR3, which maps to SPFN0 in the nPT. Therefore, an 8-
byte memory block on SPFN0, whose offset is determined by
bit 47-39 of the virtual address of the instruction, is loaded by
the processor as if it is an entry of the page table directory. As
long as the corresponding memory block follows the format
of a PTE (to be described shortly), the data can be extracted
and notified to the adversary as the faulting address (encoded
in the EXITINFO2 field of VMCB).
1) Dumping Victim Page Tables: A direct security
consequence of CROSSLINE V1 is to dump the victim
VM’s entire guest page table, which is deemed confidential
as page-table pages are always encrypted in SEV VMs
regardless of the C-bit in the PTEs.
To dump the page table, the adversary first locates the root
of the victim VM’s guest page table specified by its gCR3.
She can do so by monitoring the victim VM’s page access
sequence using page-fault side channels. Specifically, during
the victim VM’s VMEXIT, the adversary clears the Present bit
of all page entries of the nPT of the victim VM, evicts all the
TLB entries, invalidates the nPT entries cached by nTLB and
PWC. After VMRUN, the victim VM immediately performs
a page table walk. The gPA of the first page to be accessed
is stored in its gCR3. The adversary thus learns the gPA of
the root of the guest page table. Once each of the entries of
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the root page table is extracted by CROSSLINE V1, the rest
of the page table can be decrypted one level after another.
Evaluation. We evaluated this page table dump attack using
CROSSLINE on a blade server with an 8-Core AMD EPYC
7251 Processor. The host OS runs Ubuntu 64-bit 18.04 with
Linux kernel v4.20 and the guest VMs run Ubuntu 64-bit 18.04
with Linux kernel v4.15 (SEV supported since v4.15). The
QEMU version used was QEMU 2.12. The victim VMs were
SEV-enabled VMs with 4 virtual CPUs, 4 GB DRAM and 30
GB disk storage. The attacker VMs were SEV-enabled VMs
with only one virtual CPU, 2 GB DRAM and 30 GB disk
storage. All the victim VMs were created by the ubuntu-18.04-
desktop-amd64.iso image with no additional modification. The
guest OS version does not matter in our attack.
To decrypt one 8-byte memory block, the adversary needs
to launch the attacker VM, let it run until a VMEXIT, change
its ASID, clear the Present bit of all PTEs. Roughly, it takes 2
seconds to decrypt one 8-byte memory block (which includes
time to deactivate the ASID, reboot the VM, and clear the
Present bit of all PTEs).
To speed up the memory decryption, the adversary could
perform the following VMCB rewinding attack. Particularly,
after extracting one 8-byte block through a VMEXIT caused
by the nested page fault, the adversary could continue to
decrypt the next 8-byte block without rebooting the attacker
VM. To do so, the adversary directly repeats the attack steps by
rewinding the VMCB of the attacker VM to the previous state
and changing the NRIP to perform the next round of attack.
With this approach, we found the average time to decrypt a
4KB memory page (with 1 attacker VM in 500 trials) was
only 39.580ms (with one standard deviation of 4.26ms).
2) Reading Arbitrary Memory Content: Beyond page
tables, the adversary could also extract regular memory
pages of the victim VM. For example, if the data of
an 8-bytes memory block is 0x00 0x00 0xf1 0x23
0x45 0x67 0x8e 0x7f, the extracted data through page
fault is 0x712345678; if the data is 0x00 0x00 0x0a
0xbc 0xde 0xf1 0x20 0x01, the extracted data is
0xabcdef12. However, as CROSSLINE V1 only reveals the
encrypted data as a page frame number embedded in the
PTE, such memory decryption only works on 8-byte aligned
memory blocks (i.e., the begin address of the block is a
multiple of 8 and the size of the block is also 8 bytes) that
conforms to the format of a PTE.
Concretely, as shown in Figure 4, the 8-byte memory block
to be extracted from CROSSLINE, must satisfy the following
requirements: The Present bit (bit 0) must be 1; Bits 48-62
must be all 0s, and Bits 7-8 are both 0s (optional). This is
because the Present bit must be 1 to trigger nested page fault.
Otherwise, non-present faults in the guest VM will be handled
without involving the hypervisor. Bits 48-62 are reserved and
must be 0. The Page Size (PS) bit (bit-7) is used to determine
the page size (e.g., 4KB vs. 2MB); the Global Page (G) bit
(bit-8) is used to indicate whether the corresponding page is a
global page. These 2 bits can only be set 1 in the last level of
the page table. Therefore, if CROSSLINE V1 generates page
faults at the top-level page table, they must be set 0. However,
Figure 4: Valid PTE format.
we find it possible to configure the nPT so that the first three
levels of the guest page table walk all pass successfully, and
only trigger the nested page fault at the last-level page table.
In this way, the target memory block can be regarded as a
PTE of the last-level page table and hence these two bits are
not restricted to be 0s.
Performance evaluation. The speed of memory decryption
for arbitrary memory content is the same as dumping page
tables, as long as the they are of PTE format. If the target
block does not conform to the PTE format, a triple fault takes
place instead of nested page fault, in which case the adversary
could perform the VMCB rewinding attack and target another
memory block in the next round of attacks.
Percentage of readable memory blocks. We studied the bi-
nary file of ten common applications, python 2.7, OpenSSH
7.6p1, perl 5.26.1, VIM 8.0.1453, tcpdump 4.9.3, patch
2.7.6, grub-install 2.02.2, sensors 3.4.0 , Nginx
1.14.0, and diff 3.6, which are installed from the default
package archives in Ubuntu 18.04 (64-bit). The percentages
of 8-byte aligned memory blocks that can be directly read
using this method is 1.00%, 1.53%, 1.79%, 1.81%, 2.10%,
3.50%, 4.00%, 5.88%, 6.10%, and 6.50%. While they only
account for a small portion of the whole memory space, they
leak enough information for process fingerprinting purposes.
B. Variant 2: Executing Victim VM’s Encrypted Instructions
In CROSSLINE V2, we show that, when certain conditions
are met, it is possible for the attacker VM to momentarily
execute a few instructions that are encrypted in the victim
VM’s memory. Apparently, CROSSLINE V2 is more powerful
than the previous variant. Fortunately, the only prerequisite of
CROSSLINE V2 is the consequence of CROSSLINE V1.
Similar to the settings in the previous attack variant, two
SEV VMs were configured so that the ASID of the victim
VM is 1 and the ASID of the attacker VM is 2. We assume
that the attacker VM aims to execute one instruction—“movl
$2020, %r15d”—in the victim VM’s encrypted memory.
Let the virtual address of this target instruction be gVA0
and the corresponding gCR3 of the target process be gCR30.
The adversary’s strategy is to follow the common steps of
CROSSLINE attacks and manipulate the nPT of the attacker
VM so that it finishes a few nested page table walks to success-
fully execute this instruction. More specifically, CROSSLINE
V2 can be performed in the following steps:
➀ Prepare nPT. The hypervisor clears the Present bit of
all PTEs of the attacker VM’s nPT. It also prepares valid
mappings for the gVA0 to the physical memory encrypted with
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the victim’s VEK. To do so, the hypervisor needs to prepare
five gPA to sPA mappings (for the gPFNs of the four levels
of the gPT and the instruction page), respectively.
➁ Set NRIP. The hypervisor sets NRIP as gVA0. It also clears
the Interrupt Flag of the RFLAGs register (RFLAGS.IF) in
the VMCB, so that the attacker VM directly executes the next
instruction specified by NRIP, instead of referring to Interrupt-
Descriptor-Table Register.
➂ Change ASID. The hypervisor changes the attacker VM’s
ASID to the victim’s ASID, marks the VMCB as dirty, and
resumes the attacker VM with VMRUN. During the next
VMEXIT, the value of %r15 has been changed to $2020,
which means the attacker VM has successfully executed an
instruction that is encrypted with the victim’s VEK.
These experiments suggest that CROSSLINE allows the
attacker VM to execute some instruction of the victim VM.
We exploit this capability to construct decryption oracles and
encryption oracles.
1) Constructing Decryption Oracles: A decryption oracle
allows the adversary to decrypt an arbitrary memory block
encrypted with the victim’s VEK. With CROSSLINE V2, the
attacker VM executes one instruction of the victim VM to
decrypt the target memory.
The first step of constructing a decryption oracle is to
locate an instruction in the victim VM with the format of
“mov (%reg1),%reg2”, which loads an 8-byte memory
block whose virtual address is specified in reg1 to register
reg2. As most memory load instructions follow this format,
the availability of such an instruction is not an issue. The
adversary can leverage CROSSLINE V1 to scan the physical
memory of the victim VM, in the hope that the readable mem-
ory blocks contain such a 3-byte instruction. Alternatively, if
the kernel version of the victim VM is known, the adversary
can scan the binary file of the kernel image to locate this
instruction and then obtain its runtime location by reading the
gPT, which can be completely extracted by CROSSLINE V1.
Let the virtual address of this instruction be gVA0, its
corresponding system physical address be sPA0, and the gCR3
value of the process in the victim VM be gCR30. The
virtual address and the system physical address of the target
memory address to be decrypted are gVA1 and sPA1. Note
since the adversary is able to extract the gPT of the victim,
the corresponding translation for gVA0 and gVA1 can be
obtained. Then following the three steps outlined above, during
a VMEXIT of the attacker VM, the adversary prepares the nPT
of the attacker VM (including one mapping for gCR30, four
mappings for gVA0, and four mappings for gVA1), configures
the VMCB (including NRIP, ASID, the value of %reg1), and
then resumes the attacker VM.
In the next VMEXIT, the adversary is able to extract the
secret stored in sPA1 by checking the value of %reg2. The
adversary can immediately perform the next round of memory
decryption. The system physical page frame number can be
manipulated in the last-level nPT and the page offset can be
controlled in %reg1.
Performance evaluation. We measured the performance
of the decryption oracle described above for decrypting a
4KB memory page. With only one attacker VM, the average
decryption time (of 5 trials) for a 4KB page was 113.6ms
with one standard deviation of 4.3ms. Note the decryption
speed is slower than the optimized version of CROSSLINE
V1, but the decryption oracle constructed with CROSSLINE
V2 is more powerful as it is not limited by the format of the
target memory block.
2) Constructing Encryption Oracles: An encryption or-
acle allows the adversary to alter the content of an arbitrary
memory block encrypted with the victim’s VEK to the value
specified by the adversary. With CROSSLINE V2, an encryp-
tion oracle can be created in ways similar to the decryption
oracle. The primary difference is that the target instruction is
of the format “mov %reg1,(%reg2)”, which moves an 8-byte
value stored in reg1 to the memory location specified by reg2.
With an encryption oracle, the adversary could breach the
integrity of the victim VM and force the victim VM to (1)
execute arbitrary instruction, or (2) alter sensitive data, or (3)
change control flows. Note that our encryption oracle differs
from those in the prior works [8], [6], [17] as it does not rely
on SEV’s memory integrity flaws.
Performance evaluation. We measured the performance of
the encryption oracle by the time it takes to updates the content
of a 4KB memory page. The average time of 5 trials was
104.8ms with one standard deviation of 6.1ms. Note in a real-
world attack, the attacker may only need to change a few bytes
to compromise the victim VM, which means the attack can be
done within 1ms.
3) Locating Decryption/Encryption Instructions: In the
previous experiments, we have already shown that once the
instructions to perform decryption and encryption can be
located, the construction of decryption and encryption oracles
is effective and efficient. Next, we show how to locate such
decryption/encryption instructions to bridge the gap towards
an end-to-end attack.
Specifically, on the victim VM, an OpenSSH server (SSH-
2.0-OpenSSH-7.6p1 Ubuntu-4ubuntu0.1) is pre-installed.
First, the adversary learns the version of the OpenSSH binary
by monitoring the SSH handshake protocol. More specifically,
the adversary who controls the hypervisor and host OS moni-
tors the incoming network packets to the victim VM to identify
the SSH client_hello message. The victim VM would
immediately respond with an SSH server_hello message,
which contains the version information of the OpenSSH server.
As these messages are not encrypted, the adversary could
leverage this information to search encryption/decryption in-
structions offline from a local copy of the binary.
Second, the adversary extracts the gCR3 of the sshd process.
To do so, upon observing the server_hello message, the
adversary immediately clears the Present bits of all PTEs of
the victim VM. The next memory access from the sshd process
will trigger an NPF VMEXIT, which reveals the value of
gCR3. We empirically validated that this approach allows the
adversary to correctly capture sshd’s gCR3, by repeating the
above steps 50 times and observing correct gCR3 extraction
every time.
Third, the adversary uses CROSSLINE V1 to dump a portion
of the page tables of sshd process. More specifically, the
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adversary first dumps the 4KB top-level page-table page
pointed to by gCR3; she identifies the smallest offset of this
page that represents a valid PTE, and then follow this PTE to
dump the second-level page-table page. The adversary repeats
this step to dump all four levels of page tables for the lowest
range of the virtual address. In this way, the adversary could
obtain the physical address corresponding to the base virtual
address of the OpenSSH binary.
Fourth, with the knowledge of the memory layout of
the code section of the OpenSSH binary, the adversary can
calculate the physical address of the decryption/encryption
instructions within the OpenSSH binary. In our demonstrated
attack, the adversary targets two instructions inside the error
function of OpenSSH, “mov (%rbx),%rax” for decryption
and “mov %rax,(%r12)” for encryption. The offsets of the
two instructions are 0xca9a and 0xca18, respectively.
Performance evaluation.We measured the time needed to lo-
cate these two instructions. Once the adversary has intercepted
the SSH handshake messages, it takes on average 504.74ms
(over 5 trials) to locate these two instructions.
C. Discussion on Stealthiness and Robustness
CROSSLINE attacks are stealthy. The attacker VM and
the victim VM are two separate VMs. They have different
NPTs and VMCBs. Therefore, any state changes made in
the attacker VM are not observable by the victim. As such,
it is impossible for victim VM to sense the presence of
the attacker VM. In contrast to all known attacks to SEV,
CROSSLINE cannot be detected by running a detector in the
victim VM. More interestingly, the adversary can rewind the
attacker VM’s VMCB to eliminate the side effects caused by
the attacker VM’s attack behaviors (e.g., triggering a NPF
with non-PTE format or executing an illegal instruction). This
method also increases the robustness of the attack: Even if the
encryption/decryption instructions are not correctly located,
CROSSLINE V2 will not affect the execution of the victim
VM. Therefore, the adversary can perform the attack multiple
times until succeeds.
V. APPLICABILITY TO SEV-ES
A. Overview of SEV-ES
To protect VMCB during VMEXIT, SEV-ES was later
introduced by AMD [13]. With SEV-ES, a portion of the
VMCB is encrypted with authentication. Therefore, the
hypervisor can no longer read or modify arbitrary register
values during VMEXITs. To exchange data between the
guest VM and the hypervisor, a new structure called Guest
Hypervisor Control Block (GHCB) is shared between the
two. The guest VM is allowed to indicate what information
to be shared through GHCB.
VMEXITs under SEV-ES modes are categorized into Au-
tomatic Exits (AE) and Non-Automatic Exits (NAE). AE
VMEXITs (e.g., those triggered by most nested page faults, by
the PAUSE instruction, or by physical and virtual interrupts)
are VMEXITs, which do not need to expose register values
to the hypervisor. Therefore, AE VMEXITs directly trigger
a VMEXIT to trap into the hypervisor. To enhance security,
NAEs (e.g., those triggered by CPUID, RDTSC, MSR_PROT
instructions) are first emulated by the guest VM instead of the
hypervisor. Specifically, NAEs first trigger #VC exceptions,
which are handled by the guest OS to determine which register
values need to be copied into the GHCB. This NAE VMEXIT
will then be handled by hypervisor that extracts the register
values from the GHCB. After the hypervisor resuming the
guest in VMRUN, the #VC handler inside the guest OS reads
the results from the GHCB and copies the relevant register
states to corresponding registers.
SEV-ES VMs can run concurrently with SEV VMs and non-
SEV VMs. After VMEXIT, the hardware recognizes an SEV-
ES VM by the SEV control bits (bit-2 and bit-1 of 090h) in
the VMCB [4]. Therefore, the hypervisor may change the SEV
type (from an SEV VM to an SEV-ES VM) during VMEXIT.
The legal ASID ranges of SEV-ES and SEV VMs, however,
are disjoint, and thus it is not possible to run an SEV-ES VM
with an ASID in the range of SEV VMs.
1) VMCB’s Integrity Protection: With SEV-ES, the
VMCB is divided into two separate sections, namely the
control area and the state save area (VMSA) [4]. The control
area is unencrypted and controlled by the hypervisor, which
contains the bits to be intercepted by the hypervisor, the guest
ASID (058h), control bits of SEV and SEV-ES (090h), TLB
control (058h), VMCB clean bits (0C0h), NRIP (0C8h), the
gPA of GHCB (0A0h), the nCR3 (0B0h), VMCB save state
pointer (108h), etc. The state save area is encrypted and
integrity protected, which contains the saved register values
of the guest VM. The VMCB save state pointer stores the
system physical address of VMSA, the encrypted memory
page storing the state save area.
The integrity-check value of the state save area is stored in
the protected DRAM, which cannot be accessed by any soft-
ware, including the hypervisor [4]. At VMRUN, the processor
performs an integrity check of the VMSA. If the integrity
check fails, VMRUN terminates with errors [4]. Because
the integrity-check value (or the physical address storing the
value) is not specified by the hypervisor at VMRUN, we
conjecture the value is index by the system physical address
of the VMSA. Therefore, a parked virtual CPU is uniquely
identified by the VMSA physical address.
B. CROSSLINE V1 on SEV-ES
The primary challenge to apply CROSSLINE on SEV-ES
machines is to bypass the VMSA check. Directly resuming the
attacker VM using the victim’s ASID would cause VMRUN
to fail immediately, because the VMSA integrity check takes
place before fetching any instructions in the attacker VM.
Since the attacker VM’s VMSA is encrypted using the VEK
of the attacker VM, when resuming the attacker VM with the
victim’s ASID, the decryption of VMSA leads to garbage data,
crashing the attacker VM immediately.
Therefore, to perform CROSSLINE V1, the adversary must
change the save state pointer (0108h) of the attacker VM’s
VMCB so that the attacker VM will reuse the victim VM’s
VMSA. As such, the attacker VM cannot change the register
values that are stored in the VMSA, which includes RIP,
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gCR3, and all general-purpose registers (if not exposed in the
GHCB). Therefore, with SEV-ES, the adversary is no longer
able to arbitrarily control the execution of the attacker VM by
simply manipulating its NRIP in its VMCB’s control area [4].
However, by pausing victim’s VCPU during VMEXIT
and changing attacker’s VMSA pointer (0108h) to victim’s
VMSA, the adversary is still able to perform CROSSLINE
V1 on SEV-ES VMs to achieve the same goal—extracting
the entire gPT or decrypting any 8-byte memory block
conforming to a PTE format. To show this, we have
performed the following experiments:
Two SEV-ES VMs were launched. The ASID of the victim
VM is set to be 1 and that of the attacker VM is 2. The
hypervisor pauses the victim VM at one of its VMEXIT, so
that its VMSA is not used by itself. The attack is performed
in the following steps:
➀ Prepare nPT. During the VMEXIT of the attacker VM,
the hypervisor clears the Present bits of the all PTEs in the
attacker VM’s nPT.
➁ Manipulate the attacker VM’s VMCB. The hypervisor
first changes the attacker VM’s ASID from 2 to 1. It also
informs the hardware to flush all TLB entries of the current
CPU, by setting the TLB clearing field (058h) in the VMCB
control area. Finally, it changes the VMCB save area pointer
to point to the victim’s VMSA.
➂ Resume the attacker VM. Because the attacker VM runs
with the victim’s ASID, the victim’s VMSA is decrypted
correctly. The integrity check also passes, as no change is
made in the VMSA, including its system physical address.
Once resumed, the attacker VM will try to fetch the first
instruction determined by RIP (in VMSA) or the IDTR using
the victim’s VEK. Since there is no valid TLB entry, the
processor has to perform a guest page table walk to translate
the virtual address to the system physical address. A nested
page fault can be observed with the faulting address being the
victim VM’s gCR3 value.
➃ Remap gCR3 in nPT. When handling this NPF VMEXIT,
the hypervisor remaps the gCR3 in the nPT to the victim
VM’s memory page to be decrypted. The Present bits of
the corresponding nested PTEs are set to avoid another NPF
of this translation. Moreover, the EXITINTINFO field in
the unencrypted VMCB control area needs to be cleared to
make sure the attacker VM complete the page table walk.
After resuming the attacker VM, an NPF for the translation
of another gPA (embedded in the target memory block) will
occur, which reveals the content of the 8-byte aligned memory
block if it follows the format of a PTE.
➄ Reuse the VMSA. The hypervisor repeats step ➃ so that
its gCR3 is remapped to the next page to be decrypted in
the victim VM. Then, the next NPF VMEXIT reveals the
corresponding memory block. This could work because the
attacker VM has not successfully fetched a single instruction
yet; it is trapped in the first page table walk (more specifically,
the first nested page table walk of the first gPA). Therefore,
the VMSA is not updated and no valid TLB entry is created.
During the remapping of gCR3, the hypervisor is able to inval-
idate the previously generated entry in the nTLB. Thus, from
the perspective of the attacker VM, step ➃ does not change
its state. Therefore, the attacks can be carried out repeatedly.
➅ Handling triple faults. In step ➃ or ➄, if the targeted
8-byte memory block does not conform to the PTE format, a
triple fault VMEXIT (error code 0x7f) will be triggered instead
of the NPF VMEXIT. The adversary can continue to decrypt
the next page if this happens. However, after a triple fault, the
RIP in the VMSA has been updated to the fault handler to
deal with the fault. As such, resuming from a triple fault will
lead to the decryption of a different offset of the target page.
However, the attack can still continue.
Resuming the victim VM. After performing CROSSLINE V1,
the VMSA of the victim VM is still usable by the victim.
We empirically validated this by resuming the victim VM
after the attacker VM has used this VMSA to decrypt several
memory blocks and has encountered both nested page faults
and triple faults. The victim VM was resumed successfully,
without observing any faults or abnormal kernel logs.
To better understand the victim VM’s state changes when
its VMSA is used by the attacker VM, we instrumented the
hypervisor to check which regions of the encrypted VMSA
have been changed after the attacker VM has performed
several rounds of CROSSLINE V1, which triggers both nested
page faults and triple faults. The result shows that the entire
VMSA remains the same, except the value of CR2, which
stores the most recent faulting address. The change of the
CR2 value does not affect the execution of the victim VM as
this value is not used by the guest OS after NPFs.
Controlling page offsets. Because the integrity protection
of VMSA prevents the adversary from controlling the RIP
after VMRUN, the page offset of the memory blocks to be
decrypted cannot be controlled in CROSSLINE V1. However,
the adversary may resume the victim VM and allow it to run
till a different RIP is encountered. In total, 512 different RIPs
are needed to decrypt any memory blocks conforming to the
PTE formats. To diversify the exploited RIPs, one strategy
is to pause the victim when the VMEXIT is a NPF-triggered
AE. When VMEXITs are NAEs or interrupt-triggered AEs, the
next instruction to be executed after VMRUN is an instruction
of the #VC handler, whose virtual address is fixed in the
kernel address space. To differentiate NPF-triggered AEs and
interrupt-triggered AEs, although the adversary cannot read
the RFLAG.IF directly, which indicates pending interrupts, she
can inspect Bit 8 (V IRQ) of the Virtual Interrupt Control field
(offset 60h) in the unencrypted VMCB control area. Moreover,
as two consecutive NPF-triggered AEs may be caused by the
same RIP, it is preferred to pause the victim VM after a few
AEs. To trigger more NPF VMEXITs, one could periodically
unset the Present bit of all PTEs of the victim VM.
With these strategies in place, we empirically evaluated
the time needed for the adversary to find all 512 offsets. In
our test, we let the victim VM run a build-in program of
Ubuntu Linux, called “cryptsetup benchmark”. The attack can
be performed on any level of the page tables; bits 47-39, 38-
30, 29-21, and 20-12 of the same RIP can all be used as the
page offset by the attacker. Therefore, with any RIP, there
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Figure 5: Covered offsets after N rounds.
are 1∼4 different offsets that the attacker may use to extract
data on any encrypted page. The experiments were performed
in the following manner: Each round of the experiments, the
cryptsetup benchmark were run several times and each time
with a different address space layout due to ASLR; every 30
seconds, the adversary unset all Present bits of the victim VM
to trigger NPFs; the adversary pauses the victim VM every 13
AE VMEXITs to extract one RIP. The adversary concludes
the round of monitoring after 60 seconds. In total, 15 rounds
of experiments were conducted. Figure 5 shows the number
of offsets that can be covered after N rounds of experiments,
where N = 1 to 6. Each data point is calculated over all
combinations of selecting N rounds from the 15 rounds,
i.e., C(15, N), of data collected in the experiments above.
Specifically, on average, after 5 rounds of experiments, the
adversary could obtain 493 offsets; after 6 rounds, she could
obtain 511 offsets (out of the 512 offsets). These experiments
show that when the victims run an application that has diverse
RIPs (i.e., not running in idle loops), the adversary has a
good chance of performing CROSSLINE V1 on almost all page
offsets after some efforts (in these experiments, after 6 minutes
of the victim’s execution).
Performance evaluation. We have evaluated the attack men-
tioned above on a workstation with an 8-Core AMD EPYC
7251 Processor. The motherboard of our testbed machine
was GIGABYTE MZ31-AR0, with which we successfully
configured Fn8000 001F[EDX] to return 5, which means
ASID 1 to 4 were reserved for SEV-ES VMs. Since the source
code supporting SEV-ES for both host OS and guest OS has
not been added into the mainstream Linux kernel yet, we used
the source code provided in the SEV-ES branch of AMD’s
official repositories for SEV, which is available on Github [5].
The kernel version for the host and guest were branch sev-
es-5.1-v9. The QEMU version used was QEMU sev-es-v4
and the OVMF version was sev-es-v11. Both victim VMs and
attacker VMs were configured as SEV-ES-enabled VMs with
1 virtual CPU, 2 GB DRAM and 30 GB disk storage. All VMs
were created by the kernel image generated from sev-es-5.1-v9
branch without any additional modification.
On average over 200 trials, it takes 2.0ms to decrypt one
8-byte memory block, which is slower than the attack against
SEV VMs (0.077ms per block). This is because the AMD-SP
must calculate the hash of the VMSA and store it to the secure
memory region during VMEXITs, and validate its integrity
after each VMRUN. This happens in between of decrypting
two memory blocks.
C. CROSSLINE V2 on SEV-ES
Applying CROSSLINE V2 on SEV-ES would be
challenging, because with the encrypted VMCB, RIP is
no longer controlled by the adversary. As such, the attacker
VM will resume from the RIP stored in the VMSA,
which prevents the attacker VM from executing arbitrary
instructions. Moreover, constructing useful encryption or
decryption oracles requires the manipulation of specific
register values, which is only possible without SEV-ES.
D. Discussion on Stealthiness
Unlike CROSSLINE on SEV, to attack SEV-ES machines,
the attacker VM must reuse the victim VM’s VMSA. However,
CROSSLINE V1 is still stealthy and undetectable by the victim
VM for two reasons. First, the attack only alters the CR2 field
of the victim’s VMSA. As this field is not examined by the
guest OS after resumption from a NPF, the victim VM cannot
detect the anomaly. Second, even if the guest OS is modified,
the change of the CR2 cannot be detected, because the AE
NPFs are directly trapped into the hypervisor, such that the
guest OS does not have a chance to record the original value
of CR2 to be compared with.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. A New Variant: Reusing Victim’s TLB Entries
First, we discuss a proof-of-concept attack that extends the
other two variants. In particular, in this attack, we show that
the ASID-based TLB isolation can be breached. There were
two VMs involved: the victim VM is an SEV VM whose ASID
is 1; the attacker VM is a non-SEV VM whose ASID is 16.
Both VMs only have one VCPU, which are configured by the
hypervisor to run on the same logical CPU core. We assume
the victim VM executes the following code snippet:
d83 : 41 bb e4 07 00 00 mov $0x7e4 ,% r11d
d89 : 41 bc e4 07 00 00 mov $0x7e4 ,% r12d
d8f : 0 f a2 cpu i d
d91 : eb f0 jmp d83
Specifically, the code updates the values of %r11d and
%r12d, and then executes a CPUID to trigger a VMEXIT.
Following the common steps of CROSSLINE, the adversary
launches an attacker VM, changes its ASID during VMEXIT,
sets the NRIP of the attacker VM to the virtual address of
the code snippet above, changes offset 090h of VMCB to
make it an SEV VM, and resumes the attacker VM. Unlike
CROSSLINE V1 and CROSSLINE V2, the nPT of the attacker
VM is not changed in this step. Therefore, if the attacker VM
performs a page table walk, a NPF will be triggered.
Interestingly, the execution of the attacker VM triggers
CPUID VMEXITs before a triple fault VMEXIT crashes
it. Since no NPF is observed, the attacker VM apparently
does not perform any page table walk. However, during the
attacker VM’s CPUID VMEXITs, we observe that the values
of %r11d and %r12d have been successfully changed to
$0x7e4. It is clear that the two MOV instructions and the
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subsequent CPUID instruction have been executed by the
attacker VM. This is because the attacker VM was able to
use the victim VM’s TLB entries left in the TLB to translate
the virtual address of the instructions. The triple fault might be
caused by code executed outside the page, whose translation
is not cached in the TLB.
While the consequences of this attack are close to V2,
it highlights the following flaws in AMD’s TLB isolation
between guest VMs: (1) ASIDs serve as the only identifier
for access controls to TLBs, which can be forged by the
hypervisor, and (2) TLBs cleansing during VM context switch
is performed at the discretion of the hypervisor, which may
be omitted intentionally.
B. Applicability to SEV-SNP
To address the attacks against SEV that exploit memory
integrity flaws, AMD recently announced SEV-SNP [14] and
released a whitepaper describing its high-level functionality
in January, 2020 [3]. The key idea of SEV-SNP is to provide
memory integrity protection using a Reverse Map Table
(RMP). An RMP is a table indexed by system page frame
numbers. One RMP is maintained for the entire system. Each
system page frame has one entry in the RMP, which stores
information of the page state (e.g., hypervisor, guest-invalid,
guest-valid) and ownership (i.e., the VM’s ASID and the
corresponding gPA) of the physical page. The ownership
of a physical page is established through a new instruction,
PVALIDATE, which can only be executed by the guest
VM. Therefore, the guest VM can guarantee that each guest
physical page is only mapped to one system physical page;
by construction, RMP allows each system physical page to
have only one validated owner.
After each nested page table walks that leads to a system
physical page belonging to an SEV-SNP VM (and also some
other cases), an RMP check is to be performed. The RMP
check compares the owner of the page (i.e., the ASID) with
the current ASID and compares the recorded gPA in the RMP
entry with the gPA of the current nPT walk. If a mismatch is
detected, a nested page fault will be triggered.
• CROSSLINE V1 on SEV-SNP.When applying CROSSLINE
V1 on SEV-SNP by following the same attack steps for SEV-
ES, it seems step ➀ to ➃ would work the same. As the
VMSA is also protected by the RMP, loading VMSA would
lead to an RMP check. However, as the attacker VM uses the
victim’s ASID, the check would pass. However, the NPF in
step ➄ that reveals the page content would not occur. Instead,
an NPF due to RMP check would take place, because the gPA
used in nPT walk is different from the one stored in the RMP
entry. Therefore, from the description of the RMP, it seems
CROSSLINE V1 can be prevented.
• CROSSLINE V2 on SEV-SNP. As CROSSLINE V2 does
not work on SEV-ES, it cannot be applied on SEV-SNP.
Nevertheless, SEV-SNP is still in its planning phase. Some
implementation details are still unclear3. For instance, in
our discussion with AMD engineers, AMD is developing
technologies to better isolate TLBs [4], which will thwart the
attack variant we discuss in Section VI-A. But it is not yet
clear when the technology can be officially announced and
implemented on SEV-SNP processors.
C. Intel MKTME
Similar to AMD’s SEV, Intel’s Total Memory Encryp-
tion (TME) and Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MK-
TME) [11] also provide memory encryption to software.
The concept of TME is similar to AMD SME: a memory
encryption engine is placed between the direct data path
and external memory buses, which encrypts data entering or
leaving the SOC using 128-bit AES encryption in the XTS
mode of operation. MKTME is built atop TME and supports
multiple encryption keys. When used in virtualization sce-
narios, MKTME is close to AMD’s SEV. However, different
from SEV, where each VM only possesses one encryption
key, multiple keys can be used in each VM on an MKTME
platform, allowing cross-VM memory sharing when the same
keys are used. The selection of encryption keys is controlled
by software, by specifying the key id in the upper bits of a page
table entry (PTE). In a virtualization scenario, the hypervisor
has to be trusted because it has the capability of mapping guest
VM’s memory and controlling the memory encryption keys in
the PTE. CROSSLINE is not needed in the MKTME setting
as a malicious hypervisor may directly read encrypted guest
memory. Therefore, the hypervisor is included in the TCB of
MKTME, which could greatly limit its real-world adoption.
D. Relation to Speculative Execution Attacks
CROSSLINE is not a speculative execution attack. Melt-
down [18], Spectre [16], L1TF [25], and MDS [26], [22],
[7] are prominent speculative execution attacks that exploit
transiently executed instructions to extract secret memory
data through side channels. In these attacks, instructions are
speculatively executed while the processor awaits resolution
of branch targets, detection of exceptions, disambiguation
of load/store addresses, etc.. However, in the settings of
CROSSLINE V1, no instructions are executed, as the excep-
tions take place as soon as the frontend starts to fetch instruc-
tions from the memory. The other two variants of CROSSLINE
execute instructions with architecture-visible effects.
CROSSLINE does not rely on micro-architectural side chan-
nels, either. Speculative execution attacks leverage micro-
architectural side channels (e.g., cache side channels) to leak
secret information to the program controlled by the attacker.
In contrast, CROSSLINE reveals data from the victim VM as
page frame numbers, which can be learned by the hypervisor
directly during page fault handling.
3“This white paper is a technical explanation of what the discussed tech-
nology has been designed to accomplish. The actual technology or feature(s)
in the resultant products may differ or may not meet these aspirations. Each
description of the technology must be interpreted as a goal that AMD strived
to achieve and not interpreted to mean that any such performance is guaranteed
to be fully achieved.”[3].
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VII. RELATED WORK
Past work mainly studied the insecurity of AMD SEV from
the following aspects.
Unencrypted VMCB. Before SEV-ES, the VMCB is not
encrypted at the time of VMEXIT. Hetzelt and Buhren [10]
first reported that an adversary who controls the hypervisor
could directly observe the machine states of the guest VM
by reading the VMCB structure. Moreover, they show that
the adversary could also manipulate the register values in
the VMCB before resuming the guest VM to perform return-
oriented programming (ROP) attacks [23] against the guest
VM. As a result, the adversary is able to read or write arbitrary
memory in the SEV VM. These security issues have been
completely mitigated by SEV-ES [13].
Werner et al. also explored security vulnerabilities caused
by unencrypted VMCB [27]. Their study suggests that an
adversary is able to identify applications running inside the
SEV VMs by recording register values in VMCB. The study
also shows that it is practical to inject data by locating certain
system calls and modify some registers to mislead the guest
VM. However, SEV-ES restricts most of their attacks and the
only working attack that remains is application fingerprinting.
Unauthenticated encryption. The lack of authentication in
the memory encryption is one major drawback of the SME
design, which has been demonstrated in fault injection at-
tacks [6]. SEV inherits this security issue. Therefore, a ma-
licious hypervisor may alter the ciphertext of the encrypted
memory without triggering faults in the guest VM. Another
problem with SME’s memory encryption design is that SME
uses Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode of operation in its
AES-based memory encryption. In such a scheme, the plain-
text of a 16-byte memory block is first XORed with the output
of a tweak function, which takes as input the system physical
address of the memory block and deterministically generates
a 16-byte long bit string. The outcome of the XOR operation
is then encrypted with the memory encryption key to produce
the 16-byte ciphertext.
This design choice unfortunately has enabled a chosen
plaintext attacks. Du et al. [8] reverse-engineered the tweak
function and recovered the mapping between the system phys-
ical address and the output of the tweak functions. With this
knowledge, an adversary can relate the plaintext of any two 16-
byte memory blocks if they have the same ciphertext. A chosen
plaintext attack can be conducted if the adversary is able to
force the victim VM to encrypt some plaintext blocks chosen
by the adversary (e.g., via HTTP requests): The adversary first
identifies the corresponding ciphertext of the chosen plaintext
(e.g., by recognizing repetitive patterns) and then replaces with
it (after applying the corresponding tweak functions) some
critical instructions of the victim VM (e.g., sshd) [8].
Wilke et al. [28] studied the Xor-Encrypt-Xor (XEX) mode
of memory encryption of AMD’s Epyc 3xx1 series processors,
where the tweak function XOR with the plaintext twice, both
before and after the encryption. However, in the Epyc 3xx1
processor that was studied by the authors, the entropy of the
tweak functions is only 32 bits, making brute-force attacks
practical. It is demonstrated that the adversary who breaks the
tweak function can insert some arbitrary 2-byte instruction
into encrypted memory with the help of 8MB plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. The vulnerability is also caused by the lack of
authentication in the memory encryption. Fortunately, the XEX
tweak function vulnerability exploited in the paper was fixed in
Zen 2 architecture that was released in May, 2019. Therefore,
later AMD processors are not affected by this attack.
Unprotected nPT. Hetzelt and Buhren [10] demonstrated
address translation redirection attacks (an idea first explored
by Jang et al. in the context of hardware-based external
monitors [12]) in SEV and discussed remapping guest pages
in the nPT to replay previously captured memory pages.
This idea was later realized by SEVered [20], [19], which
manipulates the nPT to breach the confidentiality of the
memory encryption. More specifically, in the SEVered attack,
the hypervisor triggers activities of the victim VM’s network-
facing application and concurrently monitor its accesses to the
encrypted memory using a page-level side channel. In this way,
the hypervisor can determine the system physical page used
to store the response data. Then, by changing the memory
mapping in the nPT, the hypervisor tricks the guest VM to
respond to network requests from the target page, leaking
secrets to the adversary.
Unprotected I/O. Li et al. [17] exploited unprotected I/O op-
erations to construct encryption and decryption oracles that en-
crypts and decrypts arbitrary memory with the victim’s VEK.
As SEV’s IOMMU hardware can only support DMA with hy-
pervisor’s VEK, a shared region within SEV VM called Soft-
ware I/O Translation Lookaside Buffer (SWIOTLB) is always
needed for SEV I/O operations. SEV VM itself needs to copy
I/O streaming from SWIOTLB to its private memory when
there are incoming I/O data; it needs to copy I/O data to the
SWIOTLB when there are outgoing I/O. This design gives the
hypervisor an opportunity to monitor and alternate I/O stream-
ing to build encryption and decryption oracles. The paper also
showed these unprotected I/O problems still exist in SEV-ES.
Summary. We summarize the attacks against SEV, their
exploited vulnerabilities, the attack consequences, and the
stealthiness of the attacks in Table II. SEV-SNP can defeat
all known attacks against these design flaws, including
unencrypted VMCB, unauthenticated encryption, unprotected
nPT, and unprotected I/O. However, as SEV-SNP is not
designed to mitigate ASID abuses and the CROSSLINE
attacks, although it prevents CROSSLINE V1 as it disallows
nPT remapping, its effectiveness against CROSSLINE in
general deserves further exploration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper demystifies AMD SEV’s ASID-
based isolation for encrypted memory pages, cache lines, and
TLB entries. For the first time, it challenges the “security-by-
crash” design philosophy taken by AMD. It also proposes the
CROSSLINE attacks, a novel class of attacks against SEV that
allow the adversary to launch an attacker VM and change its
ASID to that of the victim VM to impersonate the victim.
Two variants of CROSSLINE attacks have been presented and
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Table II: Demonstrated attacks against SEV. I/O Interaction: the attack requires interaction with applications inside the victim VM through
I/O operations (e.g., Network, disk). Stealthiness: the attack cannot be detected by the victim VM.
Research Papers Exploited Vulnerabilities I/O Interaction
Breach
Confidentiality
Breach
Integrity
Stealthiness Mitigated by
Du et al. [8] Unauthenticated encryption X ✗ X ✗ SEV-SNP
Buhren et al. [6] Unauthenticated encryption X X ✗ ✗ SEV-SNP
Wilke et al. [28] Unauthenticated encryption X X X ✗ SEV-SNP
Werner et al. [27] Unencrypted VMCB X X ✗ ✗ SEV-ES
Hetzelt & Buhren [10]
Unencrypted VMCB
Unprotected PT
X X X ✗ SEV-SNP
Morbitzer et al. [20] Unprotected PT X X ✗ ✗ SEV-SNP
Morbitzer et al. [19] Unprotected PT X X ✗ ✗ SEV-SNP
Li et al. [17]
Unprotected I/O
Unauthenticated encryption
X X X ✗ SEV-SNP
CROSSLINE V1 Security-by-Crash ✗ X ✗ X SEV-SNP
CROSSLINE V2
Security-by-Crash
Unencrypted VMCB
✗ X X X SEV-ES
successfully demonstrated on SEV machines. They are the first
SEV attacks that do not rely on SEV’s memory integrity flaws.
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